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RECENT DECISIONS
PURCHASER OF LEASED PROPERTY MAY DEPRECIATE COST ALLOCABLE TO
BUILDING CONSTRUCTED BY LEsSEE.-Lessee-corporation leased two lots lo-
cated in a metropolitan area, the lease taking effect on July 1, 1928, for a
term of fifty years with annual rentals averaging $28,500. As required by
the provisions of the lease, lessee-corporation constructed a building on the
property at a cost in excess of $250,000.' In 1950 taxpayer purchased the
entire interest of the lessor in the two lots, including the right to receive
rentals from the outstanding lease. In each of the years 1952, 1953, and
1954 taxpayer deducted $10,547.92 for depreciation and amortization. The
deductions were computed by dividing the number of years remaining in
the term of the lease into $300,000, the portion of the purchase price which
taxpayer claimed was allocable to the building. The Commissioner disal-
lowed the deductions and the United States Tax Court upheld the Com-
missioner's decision.' On appeal to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 8th
Circuit, held, reversed.' The purchaser of leased property on which the
lessee has constructed a building may deduct, as depreciation, the amount
of his investment allocable to the building. World Piiblishing Company v.
Commissioner, 299 F.2d 614 (8th Cir. 1962).
A taxpayer who acquires an asset which decreases in value may de-
preciate its value through deductions from his federal income tax.! The
amount of the depreciation deductible depends in part upon the basis of
the asset. The basis is either the cost of the asset to the taxpayer or the
fair market value of the asset when it was acquired.' If, under the Internal
Revenue Code, the asset may be depreciated, the taxpayer is allowed to re-
'The lease also provided that upon its termination all buildings erected upon the
premises were to become a part of the realty and the property of the lessor. The
lessor had the right to subject the land and the improvements to mortgage liens;
to amend or reject plans and specifications for the building; to be protected by
adequate insurance at the expense of the lessee, the lessor being named as the in-
sured ; and to inspect the building at any time with the lessee bearing the cost of
maintenance. The lessee was to pay all taxes and assessments upon the land and
improvements, or "which the Lessor shall be required to pay by reason of or on
account of its interest in said land or improvements, or Its interest in or under this
lease, except estate, inheritance, and income taxes."235 T.C. 7 (1960).
'The court remanded to the Tax Court with directions to recompute the taxpayer's
deficiencies in accord with the views expressed.
"'General Rule.-There shall be allowed as a depreciation deduction a reasonable
allowance for the exhaustion, wear and tear (including a reasonable allowance for
obsolescence) -
"(1) of property used in the trade or business, or
"(2) of property held for the production of income." INT. REV. CODE of 1954,
§ 167(a). Section 23(1) of the 1939 INT. R.v. CODE is the section applicable to
the tax years involved.
'"Basis of property-Cost. The basis of property, shall be the cost of such property
... ' INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 1012. Compare INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 1014:
"(a) In General.-Except as otherwise provided in this section, the basis of prop-
erty in the hands of a person acquiring the property from a decedent ... shall ...
be the fair market value of the property at the date of the decedent's death...."
See, e.g., Parsons v. United States, 227 F2d 437 (3rd Cir. 1955) ; Detroit Edison
Co. v. Comm'r, 319 U.S. 98 (1943) ; Reis v. Comm'r, 142 F.2d 900 (6th Cir. 1944);
Oxford Paper Co. v. United States, 86 F. Supp. 366 (D.C.N.Y. 1949).
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cover the basis as depreciation occurs by taking periodic deductions from
his income tax during the estimated useful life of the asset.' If, however,
depreciation is not allowed, the taxpayer may not recover any of his basis
until final disposition of the asset.'
No prior cases have arisen where the taxpayer has purchased leased
property upon which the lessee has constructed a building However, an
analogous situation arises where the property has been inherited by the
taxpayer.' The courts have held in these cases that: (1) the land is a
non-depreciable asset; (2) the lease is also non-depreciable on the ground
that the rights under it are merely an incident to the taxpayer-lessor's fee
ownership of the land,m and (3) the right to depreciate the building de-
pends upon the character of the lease." If the rents are greater than could
be presently obtained on the same property, the lease is characterized as
favorable;2 if the rents are less than could be presently obtained on the
same property, the lease is unfavorable;' if the rents approximate what
could currently be obtained on the same property, the lease is ordinary."
When the lease is favorable, the courts have held that the basis of the prop-
erty is its fair market value when acquired by the taxpayer,' and the por-
tion of this basis allocable to the building is depreciable if the building
is used in the taxpayer's trade or business or is held by him for the pro-
duction of income."
When the lease is unfavorable, if the incident to the fee theory is ap-
plied, the portion of the total basis allocable to the non-depreciable asset,
the land, would be reduced by the burden of the unfavorable lease. At the
same time the building would be given its full market value as a depreciable
asset. In economic reality, as the unfavorable lease expires, the land, re-
lieved of its burden of the unfavorable lease, would appreciate and at the
eFor the methods of computing depreciation allowance compare Treas. Reg.
§ 1.167(b)-0 (1960), as amended, T.D. 6500; Treas. Regs. §§ 1.167(b)-i to (b)-4.
'INT. REv. CODE of 1954, §§ 1011, 1016.
'Instant case at 621.
'First Nat'l Bank v. Nee, 190 F.2d 61 (8th Cir. 1951) ; Goelet v. United States, 266
F.2d 881 (2d Cir. 1.959), affirming 161 F. Supp. 305 (S.D.N.Y. 1958) ; Schubert v.
Comm'r, 286 F.2d 573 (4th Cir.), cert. denied 366 U.S. 960 (1961), affirming 33 T.C.
1048 (1960) ; Friend v. Comm'r, 119 F.2d 959 (7th Cir.) cert. denied 314 U.S. 673
(1941), affirming 40 B.T.A. 768 (1939).
"°When a lease is an incident to the lessor's fee ownership of the land, its value and
the value of the land are combined to determine the basis of the land. Both are
non-depreciable. See, e.g., Martha R. Peters, 4 T.C. 1236 (1945) ; Milton H. Friend,
40 B.T.A. 768 (1939; Comm'r v. Pearson, 188 F.2d 72 (5th Cir.), cert. denied 342
U.S. 861 (1951), reversing 13 T.C. 851 (1949). An exception to these cases is
Comm'r v. Moore, 207 F.2d 265 (9th Cr. 1953), cert. denied 347 U.S. 942 (1954),
reversing with directions 15 T.C. 906 (1950), wherein the court allowed the lease
to be depreciated.
"Rubin, Depreciation of Property Purchased Subject to a Lease, 65 HARv. L. REV.
1134.
'See, e.g., Mary Young Moore, 15 T.C. 906, 910 (1950) ; Milton H. Friend, 40 B.T.A.
768, 771 (1939) (advantageously leased) ; Martha R. Peters, 4 T.C. 1236, 1240
(1945) (advantageously leased).
iSee, e.g., First Nat'l Bank v. Nee, supra note 9; Comm'r v. Pearson, supra note 10.
'
4Rubin, supra note 11, at 1140.
'Comm'r v. Moore, supra note 10; Friend v. Comm'r, supra note 9.
aSee supra note 4. The court in Comm'r v. Moore, supra note 10, did not allow
the building to be depreciated because the term of the lease extended beyond the
useful life of the building. It reasoned that there could be no depreciation because
taxpayer did not acquire anything of value upon termination of the lease. It
must be noted that the instant case also involved a lease whose term extended .be-
yond the useful life of the building.
[Vol. 24,
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expiration of the lease the land would have a basis less than its true fair
market value. To avoid this result, the courts have departed from the In-
ternal Revenue Code and have held that the basis of property burdened
by an unfavorable lease is not its fair market value when acquired by the
taxpayer but its fair market value when leased by the decedent, taxpayer's
predecessor in interest.' The courts reason that the land when leased by
the taxpayer's decedent was unimproved and its fair market value repre-
sented the value of (1) the land and (2) the lease which is considered to
be incident to the fee of the land. Both of these assets are non-depreciable.
Since the taxpayer can acquire no interest greater than that possessed by
his decedent and inasmuch as his decedent had no depreciable interest in
the property, the taxpayer can acquire no depreciable interest.' Hence,
the building is not allowed to be depreciated in the unfavorable lease situa-
tion but, as was previously noted, is allowed to be depreciated when the
lease is favorable.
In the instant case the court relied upon the reasoning of Millinery
Center Building Corporation v. Commissioner" where a building was con-
structed upon land by the taxpayer-lessee in accordance with a lease which
contained an option to renew. The lease also provided that upon its termi-
nation title to the building would pass to the lessor. During the life of
the lease taxpayer fully depreciated the cost of the building. On his option
to renew taxpayer purchased the fee in the property, including the build-
ing, and sought to deduct depreciation for the building based on the dif-
ference between his purchase price and the value of the land if it were
unimproved. The Tax Court disallowed the deductions, six judges dis-
senting.' On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals reversed,' reasoning that
since a third-party purchaser of such a fee would be entitled to allocate,
for depreciation purposes, part of its cost to the building, depreciation
should be allowed in this case.' T~he Supreme Court, on certiorari, af-
firmed.'
Likewise in the instant case the court held that the total basis of the
property was its cost to the taxpayer and allocated a portion of this basis
to the land and the remainder to the building.' Based upon these alloca-
tions, the court held that depreciation for the building is allowable.' The
court considered the cases in which ownership was acquired by inheritance
and noted that in one of them, Commissioner v. Moare,' a taxpayer-devisee
was allowed to depreciate a favorable lease. Although the court in the
instant case was apparently confronted with an ordinary and not a favor-
"See supra note 13.
'First Nat'l Bank v. Nee, 190 F.2d 61, 67 (8th Cir. 1951) ; Comm'r v. Pearson, 188
F.2d 72, 74 (5th Cir. 1951). In the latter case the court recognized that the lessor's
basis is not determinative of the taxpayer's basis and that this is the general view
but, because of the unfavorable lease, held that the basis was the value to the
lessor.
M221 F.2d 322 (2d Cir. 1955), cert. granted 350 U.S. 456 (1956), reversing 21 T.C.
817 (1954).
2021 T.C. 817 (1954).
1221 F.2d 322 (2d Cir. 1955).
"Id. at 324.
"350 U.S. 456 (1956).
9'Instant case at 617.
"5Ibid. See supra note 4.
"See supra note 10.
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able lease,' its seeming approval of the Moore case, with respect to the
lease, may indicate that it would have allowed taxpayer to depreciate the
lease had it been favorable."
The court also held that the fair market value of the property when
leased by taxpayer's predecessor in interest is not determinative of the
right to depreciate" and thereby rejected the reasoning of the unfavorable
lease cases. Taxpayer was concerned only with the depreciation that he
would suffer from his investment in an asset which would decrease in
value,'m and the fact that his predecessor in interest had not invested in the
building was immaterial.
The position of the court in the instant case is entirely consistent with
the depreciation statutes of the Code3' and comparable sections of the Regu-
lations.' The fair market value of the property at the time of acquisition
determines the basis of property acquired by inheritance or devise.' The
taxpayer's cost determines the basis of property acquired by purchase."
The values assigned to the property when it is acquired are relevant only
in determining basis and are thereafter immaterial. ' A building is given
a basis when it is acquired which may be depreciated without consideration
of its value to the taxpayer after the expiration of its useful life.m There-
fore, the fact that the lease term is longer than the useful life of the build-
ing and that theoretically taxpayer would suffer no loss if the building
were constructed by another is immaterial. Since the basis is determined
only by the value of the property acquired by the taxpayer, any considera-
tion of the grantor's basis is also immaterial.'
It is submitted that the instant case suggests that a consistent rationale
can be developed in the leased property cases only if the courts will recog-
nize that (1) the purpose of depreciation is to allow the taxpayer tax-free
recovery of his cost and (2) that leases, favorable or unfavorable, do ex-
haust themselves over a period of time and, therefore, should be depre-
17Instant case at 616. The lease provided for rentals which were to increase through
the years.t"'Moore demonstrates, however, that one circuit has afforded relief to a taxpayer
who found himself with a newly acquired interest in property [speaking of the
favorable lease] with a newly acquired basis which had no rational relationship
to land value alone .... [T]here is an alternative argument [speaking again of
Moore and of the depreciation of the favorable lease] which has borne fruit in
at least one circuit." Instant case at 620-21.
""The taxpayer-purchaser by his purchase of the property has made an invest-
ment. He is not concerned with the identity, as between his vendor-lessor and the
tenant, of the builder of the building." Instant case at 621.
'°Ibi. Compare instant case at 622-23, where the court recognized that the lessee
was depreciating his cost of the building but found no anomaly in allowing tax-
payer to also depreciate his interest in the asset. Both had made an investment
in the asset which could be depreciated.
8See supra notes 4 and 5.
0Treas. Reg. § 1.167 (1960) ; see supra note 6.
mSee supra note 5.
MIbid.
'mRubin, supra note 11, at 1142.
"Ibid.
,'See supra note 5. The statute defines basis only in Its relation to the present tax-
payer.
[Vol. 24,
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ciable as intangible assets.' Only when the courts adopt this rationale will
they reach results which will conform to the Internal Revenue Code and
to economic reality.
HARRY A. HAINES
SCIENTER REQUIRED IN POST OFFICE CENSORSHIP PROCEEDING UNDER
I8 U.S.C. § 1461.-Three publishing corporations, having a common presi-
dent, brought suit in the United States District Court for the District of
Columbia to enjoin a nonmailability order of the Postmaster General of the
United States against certain of their magazines. The magazines, entitled
MANual, Trim, and Grecian Guild Pictorial, consist of photographs of nude
or semi-nude males, and advertisements by independent photographers of-
fering photographs of male nudes for sale. The District Court denied in-
junctive relief and sustained nonmailability on the grounds that the maga-
zines are obscene in themselves and that they contain information of where
obscenity may be obtained. The Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed.1  On
certiorari to the Supreme Court of the United States, held, reversed. Mr.
Justice Harlan, in announcing the judgment of the court, was of the view
that the magazines do not affront the current community standards of de-
cency and, hence, are not obsene in themselves. Secondly, without a showing
of scienter on the part of the publisher the magazines cannot be removed
from the mails on the grounds that they contain information of where ob-
scenity may be obtained. Mr. Justice Stewart concurred. Mr. Chief Justice
Warren, Mr. Justice Brennan, and Mr. Justice Douglas concurred in the re-
versal, but based their opinion on the ground that the Postmaster General
has no legal authority to make nonmailability determinations under 18
U.S.C. § 1461 (1955). (Mr. Justice Black concurred in the result writing
no opinion, and Mr. Justice Frankfurter and Mr. Justice White took no
part in the decision. Mr. Justice Clark dissented against both of the
separate majority opinions on the ground that the Postmaster General has
authority to make nonmailability determinations under 18 U.S.C. § 1461
(1955), and further, that scienter is an immaterial element. Manual Enter-
prises, Inc. v. Day, 82 Sup. Ct. 1432 (1962).
The divergence of opinion among the justices makes it difficult to in-
terpret the impact of the decision. Although the concept of a prior re-
straint seems crucial, it is not explicity considered in any of the opinions.
What can the Court be expected to do regarding future Post Office De-
"Although all leases theoretically constitute depreciable assets, only the favorable
lease could be depreciated because the rents received from it are greater than could
currently be obtained on the same property. This excess value would exhaust it-
self whereas in the unfavorable and ordinary lease situations there would be no
excess value to depreciate. Treas. Reg. § 1.167(a)-3 (1960): "Intangibles. If an
intangible asset is known from experience or other facts to be of use in the busi-
ness or in the production of income for only a limited period, the length of which
can be estimated with reasonable accuracy, such an intangible asset may be the
subject of a depreciation allowance." Compare Comm'r v. Moore, 207 F.2d 265,
274, 276 (9th Cir. 1953).
'Manual Enterprises, Inc. v. Day, 289 F.2d 455 (D.C. Cir. 1961).
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